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1 Introduction 
Knowledge seems to be a good thing, or at least better than epistemic states, statuses 
or conditions that fall short of it, such as mere true belief. Though it is notoriously 
difficult to account for the value knowledge appears to possess,
1
 that knowledge is 
valuable seems to be a deep-rooted conviction widely-shared by philosophers and 
non-philosophers alike, which might in part explain the considerable amount of 
attention the concept of knowledge receives in recent and not-so-recent philosophy. 
  In the contemporary literature, however, there appears to be a growing sense 
that philosophers, in focusing the bulk of their efforts on knowledge—as well as 
related epistemic notions such as justification—have neglected the concept of 
understanding.
2
 One, though not the only, reason for thinking that understanding 
deserves our attention, and so for thinking that this is indeed a case of neglect, is that 
understanding seems to be something which we value highly. Indeed, it is at least 
arguable that we value understanding more highly than we value other epistemic 
states, statuses or conditions on which philosophers have traditionally focused, most 
notably knowledge. 
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 In a number of recent publications, Duncan Pritchard has advanced an account 
of understanding which is intended to account for the distinctive value it seems to 
possess.
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 That account, which appeals to the idea that understanding is a cognitive 
achievement, has yet to receive much, if any, critical attention. In this paper, I shall 
outline Pritchard’s explanation of understanding’s value and the accompanying 
conception of achievement. While I will not deny that understanding is valuable, or at 
least more valuable than epistemic states which fall short of it, I shall reject 
Pritchard’s explanation of this fact.  
 Though the initial focus of what follows is the details of Pritchard’s particular 
proposal, I shall go on to extract a more general lesson. According to it, a certain sort 
of approach—of which Pritchard’s is one instance and of which there are many 
others—to explaining the value of a given epistemic state—whether it be 
understanding, knowledge, or whatever—is in principle misguided. Any such 
approach, I shall argue, could only really explain the value of coming to be in the 
relevant epistemic state, rather than the value of being in that state; thus, it looks, at 
best, like it offers the right answer to the wrong question. I shall shed light on this no 
doubt dark claim in due course. 
 
2 Understanding and achievement  
Before proceeding, it is important to note that there are many species of understanding, 
including: 
• propositional understanding (e.g., understanding that public spending has been 
cut); 
• objectual understanding (e.g., understanding David Cameron, or 
understanding physics);  
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• understanding how (e.g., understanding how to jumpstart a car);  
• understanding wh- (e.g., understanding why William the Conqueror invaded 
England, understanding when it is time to leave, or understanding what 
happened to the cookies). 
In this paper, following Pritchard, I shall focus primarily on understanding wh- and, 
more specifically, on understanding why (hereafter, all talk of ‘understanding’ should 
be read as concerning understanding why). Whether what Pritchard has to say about 
understanding why extends to other species of understanding and whether, in turn, my 
objections to what he has to say extend in a like manner are interesting questions but 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
 No doubt understanding is often of instrumental value. Understanding why a 
certain disease takes hold, for example, might enable us to cure it. But Pritchard’s aim 
is not to show that understanding is sometimes valuable, perhaps as a means to other 
things we value, or even that it is valuable in general as a means to other things we 
value; rather, his aim is to reveal understanding as such to be ‘distinctively, and hence 
finally, valuable’, at least other things being equal.
4
 
 As mentioned above, Pritchard’s account of the value of understanding 
appeals to the notion of achievement. In Pritchard’s view, ‘it is plausible to hold that 
the kind of successes that count as achievements are valuable for their own sake 
because of how they are produced’, at least other things being equal. In support of this, 
he writes: 
Imagine, for example, that you are about to undertake a course of action designed to 
attain a certain outcome and that you are given the choice between merely being 
successful in what you set out to do, and being successful in such a way that you 
exhibit achievement. Suppose further that it is stipulated in advance that there are no 
practical costs or benefits to choosing either way. Even so, wouldn’t you prefer to 
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exhibit achievement? And wouldn’t you be right to do so? If that is correct, then this 
is strong evidence for the final value of achievements.
5
 
One might challenge the view that achievements are finally valuable or the informal 
considerations Pritchard musters in support of that view. I shall grant both and 
consider instead whether one can appeal to the value of achievement in accounting for 
the value of understanding. 
 Pritchard distinguishes two theses concerning achievement:
6
 
(WEAK) Achievements are successes that are because of ability. 
(STRONG) Achievements are successes that are because of ability where 
the success in question either involves the overcoming of a 
significant obstacle or the exercise of a significant level of 
ability.  
In Pritchard’s view, (STRONG) captures our ordinary conception of achievement as 
something of value. I shall question this later, but Pritchard is certainly right that 
(WEAK) is too weak. Suppose you set me the task of picking up a mug of tea and I 
succeed. Though my success is due to my physical ability, it is hardly an achievement, 
let alone a valuable achievement. (That said, if one does not share this estimation, 
nothing in what follows rests on it.) 
 With this in place, Pritchard’s account of the value of understanding falls into 
place. Understanding, he claims, is a cognitive success that is because of cognitive 
ability, and so it is a cognitive achievement.
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 Since achievements in general are, at 
least qua achievements, finally valuable, it follows that understanding is finally 
valuable. 
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3 Understanding without achievement 
Clearly there are many cases in which one’s arriving at an understanding is an 
achievement. But is it in the nature of understanding as such to be an achievement in 
the (STRONG) sense? Does understanding always involve achievement? No. To 
appreciate this, consider the following example (call it, (SLUG)). As I pass the lettuces 
in my garden, I spot slugs. I thereby come to understand why my lettuces are 
failing—because slugs are eating them. This is a familiar case of understanding, one 
whose acquisition does not appear to involve, as (STRONG) requires, ‘the overcoming 
of a significant obstacle’. 
 Of course, overcoming a significant obstacle is only one way in which, 
according to (STRONG), a success can be an achievement. The other way is for the 
success to involve ‘the exercise of a significant level of ability’. Accordingly, while 
Pritchard accepts that understanding may be ‘gained with ease’—i.e. in the absence of 
great challenges and without ‘undertaking an obstacle-overcoming effort to piece 
together the relevant pieces of information’—he insists that, when so gained, ‘one is 
bringing to bear significant cognitive ability’.
8
  
However, suppose that, in the case of (SLUG), I simply notice the sorry state of 
the lettuce, notice the slugs eating its leaves, and put two and two together. The level 
of cognitive ability exercised seems minimal. Consider also the following case (call it, 
(MILK)). I see my son knocking a glass of milk and spilling its contents on to the floor. 
I thereby come to understand why there is milk on the floor—because my son 
knocked the glass and spilled the milk on to the floor. In this case, I do not even have 
to put two and two together; that is, I do not have to find the link between my son’s 
actions and the spilled milk; I simply see the spilling of the milk. The degree of 
cognitive ability exercised here is negligible. 
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One difficulty in settling this issue is that it is not clear when a level of ability 
counts as ‘significant’, so at the least Pritchard should say more about that. That said, 
there is a dilemma lurking here. On the one hand, if Pritchard construes ‘a significant 
level of ability’ in a very undemanding way—so that, for example, I count in (SLUG) 
or (MILK) as exercising it—he seems to be reverting to the conception of achievement 
captured by (WEAK), which, for good reason, he rejects. On the other hand, if 
Pritchard construes ‘a significant level of ability’ in a demanding way, it becomes 
implausible to suggest that understanding always involves its exercise—as (SLUG) 
and (MILK) show. 
Even if suitable guidance on this matter is forthcoming, does (STRONG) really 
capture our ordinary conception of achievement as something valuable? I doubt that 
success due to the exercise of a significant level of ability is sufficient for 
achievement. To adapt Pritchard’s example, imagine that Tiger Woods sinks his 
hundredth putt from a considerable distance. No doubt ‘there is great skill on display’, 
as Pritchard says,
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 but is there achievement? Perhaps to have sunk one hundred putts 
in a row is an achievement but that does not show that sinking any one of those putts 
is an achievement, especially if Woods finds any such shot effortlessly easy. To 
appreciate this, place yourself in Woods’ shoes. One can imagine, as he sinks putt 
after putt with the most casual swing of the club, his sense of achievement 
diminishing, perhaps precisely because he misses the challenge. This, in effect, is to 
suggest that (STRONG) is false—a success that is because of ability might count as an 
achievement if the success in question involves the overcoming of a significant 
obstacle, but it does not count as an achievement if it only involves the exercise of a 
significant level of ability.  
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So, even if a case could be made that there is a sense in which the examples of 
acquiring understanding described in (SLUG) and (MILK) involve a significant level of 
cognitive skill, it does not follow that they involve achievement.  
 Even if it turns out that (STRONG) is defensible, and even if Pritchard offers an 
account of what it is to exercise a significant level of skill that manages both not to be 
weak and to accommodate (SLUG) and (MILK), there seem to be many cases of 
acquiring an understanding which are not successes that are because of ability, and so 
not achievements according to (STRONG) or (WEAK). Consider the following example 
(call it, (SON)). Suppose that my son returns from the garden to tell me why the 
lettuces are failing (because the slugs are eating them). I thereby come to understand 
why the lettuces are failing. In this case, my cognitive success is not primarily due to 
my cognitive abilities but to my son’s. Thus, there is no cognitive achievement. Of 
course, my cognitive abilities do play a part in my coming to understanding, but I do 
not come to understand because of those abilities. 
 Perhaps Pritchard is assuming that, in a case like (SON), my success is because 
of my abilities, since, if I am to understand why the lettuces are failing, I have to 
‘piece together’ the information my son provides. However, let us simply stipulate 
that it is my son who pieced together the information, information which he then 
passed, pieced together, to me, perhaps by saying, ‘The lettuces are failing because 
the slugs are eating them’. 
 In response, one might continue to insist that the success in the case of (SON) 
is due to my cognitive abilities; after all, it involves exercising my ability to recognise 
what my son is telling me, to recognise a reliable informant, and so on. However, to 
make an ad hominem point, whatever is to be said for this, this is not a response 
available to Pritchard. When discussing an analogous example involving knowledge, 
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he claims that to insist that such success is primarily creditable to one’s cognitive 
ability would ‘involve denying some pretty strong intuitions’ and someone who takes 
this ‘line will face a tough uphill struggle’.
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 Moreover, to make the point less ad 
hominem, Pritchard is surely right. To exploit an example he uses for a different end, 
(SON) seems analogous to a case in which  
someone who lacks archery abilities is being assisted by a skilled archer in firing an 
arrow and is thereby successful. (For example, the skilled archer helps the novice to 
take aim, steadies his arm, corrects [his] posture, and so on.) While the unskilled 
archer’s abilities might have played some role in the successful outcome—such that it 
is to some degree creditable to him that he is successful—we would surely say that 
this success is primarily creditable to the skilled archer (or, at least, creditable to the 
combined efforts of the unskilled archer and the skilled archer). We certainly would 
not regard the success in question as being primarily creditable to the novice archer. 
On this basis, then, we would maintain that the unskilled archer’s success does not 
constitute a bona fide achievement.
11
 
By the same token, we should not count my success in (SON) as a bona fide 
achievement according to either (STRONG) or (WEAK). If Pritchard wants to insist that 
it does, he faces ‘a tough uphill struggle’. 
 One option, hinted at by Pritchard’s parenthetical remarks, might be to insist 
that the success in (SON) is due to the ‘combined efforts’ of me and my son, and 
hence qualifies as a joint achievement. This would be enough to preserve the thought 
that understanding is, qua achievement, finally valuable; whether that achievement is 
individual or shared is immaterial. 
 There are, of course, cases in which two or more individuals arrive at an 
understanding through joint cognitive labour. Unfortunately for Pritchard, (SON) is 
not such a case; it is not one in which my son and I together come to understand why 
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the lettuces are failing but one in which my son acquired this understanding without 
my help. Even if it could be shown that his doing so was an achievement, it was not 
our achievement; the understanding was already arrived at, and I simply took 
advantage of it. So, the genuine possibility of acquiring an understanding through 
sharing skills does nothing to show that all understanding involves achievement.  
To summarise, I have raised a question as to whether (STRONG) is strong 
enough to capture our ordinary conception of achievement as something of value. 
Even if it is, cases like (SLUG) and (MILK) seem to show that one can have 
understanding without achievement in the (STRONG) sense. And cases like (SON) 
seem to show that one can have understanding without achievement in even the 
(WEAK) sense. Since understanding need not involve achievement, Pritchard cannot 
account for understanding’s final value in terms of the final value of achievement. 
This is not to deny that achievement and understanding are valuable, finally or 
otherwise, or to deny that understanding can involve achievement; it is only to deny 
that the value of understanding in general is (an instance of) the value of achievement. 
 
4 Understanding, luck and difficulty 
Since, as I argued above, it seems not to be the case that coming to understand 
necessarily constitutes a valuable achievement, why would one think otherwise? In 
this section, I shall turn to the considerations Pritchard offers in support of his view 
and argue that, although in light of them one can appreciate why one might be 
attracted to such a view, those considerations do not in fact support the claim that 
acquiring an understanding is an achievement. 
 Part of Pritchard’s case for the claim that understanding is a cognitive 
achievement rests on the idea that achievements in general are compatible with 
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environmental luck.
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 To use his example, imagine that an archer takes aim at a target 
in challenging weather conditions. The archer releases the arrow and, due to his skill, 
hits the target. Intuitively, this is an achievement. Suppose further that the archer 
happened to aim at the one target in the range that is not protected by an invisible 
force-field. In that case, the success involves a certain sort of luck but it seems to 
count as an achievement nonetheless. In just the same way, Pritchard argues, 
understanding is compatible with environmental luck (in this respect, he maintains, 
understanding differs from knowledge, which is not compatible with such luck). To 
use his example, suppose that I ask a person dressed as a fire-officer why my house 
burned down. That person tells me that it was due to faulty-wiring, which ‘coheres 
with [my] wider set of beliefs’,
13
 and I thereby come to understand why my house 
burned down. Suppose further that I just happened to ask the one of the many people 
in the area dressed as fire-officers who is a genuine fire-officer. In that case, my 
epistemic standing involves a certain sort of luck but it seems to count as 
understanding nonetheless.  
 One might challenge the claim that understanding is compatible with 
environmental luck. While I have my suspicions, I shall grant it. At most, that claim 
shows that understanding is like cognitive achievement, and unlike knowledge, in not 
being undermined by a certain sort of luck, which I do not deny; it does not show that 
understanding always results from cognitive achievement. 
 The second consideration Pritchard adduces in support of the claim that all 
understanding involves cognitive achievement is as follows.
14
 There are cases in 
which one has ‘knowledge without exhibiting the corresponding cognitive 
achievement’. Call these cases of easy knowledge. These are also cases in which one 
lacks understanding, which, Pritchard claims, suggests that understanding and 
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achievement go hand in hand. To adapt Pritchard’s example, suppose that I tell my 
infant son that the house burned down due to faulty-wiring. It is natural to think that 
my son thereby comes to know why the house burned down, but his doing so is not an 
achievement; his knowledge is not primarily creditable to his abilities but to mine. 
Moreover, since my son ‘has no conception of how faulty wiring might cause a fire’, 
he does not understand why the house burned down. 
 If such cases are genuine, and I grant that they are, it hardly shows that all 
understanding involves achievement; at most, it shows that some cases in which one 
lacks understanding are also cases in which no achievement is exhibited. Moreover, 
one can allow that, in the above example, my son would have acquired an 
understanding if he had displayed a cognitive achievement of the relevant sort, but 
what Pritchard needs to demonstrate is that my son would have acquired an 
understanding only if he had displayed such a cognitive achievement.  
That said, it is not difficult to see why, in focusing on such cases, one might be 
led to Pritchard’s view. The above is a case in which one has knowledge but in which 
one lacks understanding. Since the knowledge is easy, it is tempting to think that what 
has to be added to arrive at understanding is difficulty, perhaps the sort of difficulty 
which presents an obstacle or the overcoming of which requires significant skill, i.e. 
the sort the surmounting of which involves achievement. However, tempting as this 
line of thought might be, it is mistaken. At most, the above shows that, in cases like 
the one at hand, if not in others, one has to do more to understand than to know and so 
that, in that respect, understanding is more difficult to win than knowledge; it does not 
follow that the difficulty involved is the sort that presents challenges the meeting of 
which would be creditable to the exercise of the cognitive abilities of the subject on 
that occasion.  
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It is plausible to think that my son’s lack of understanding in the above 
example is due in part to his lacking the relevant background beliefs with which to 
integrate his newly acquired information. Crucially, there is no obvious reason to 
think that, if my son were to have the relevant background beliefs, and if his newly 
acquired information were to be integrated with those beliefs, this would be 
attributable to the exercise of a significant level of skill on his part, let alone in the 
face of great obstacles. Perhaps my son just finds himself saddled with those beliefs 
and the integration of the new information is either utterly straightforward or 
something that simply happens to him, not something he does or can take credit for.  
These remarks are not intended as a contribution to an account of the 
conditions necessary or sufficient for understanding. For present purposes, the point is 
simply that it does not immediately follow from the fact that, in certain cases, 
understanding calls for more than knowledge that, in those cases and all others, 
understanding calls for achievement in overcoming obstacles or in exercising 
significant skill. At the very least, Pritchard needs to say a lot more to show that it 
does, and the previous section gives reason to doubt that such a case will be 
forthcoming. Nonetheless, while the considerations Pritchard offers do not support his 
claim that understanding always involves cognitive achievement, attending to them 
has shed some light on the attraction that view might seem to have.  
Maybe there are responses available to Pritchard to the above points, which he 
could appeal to in order to show that, despite appearances, understanding really does 
always involve achievement in a suitably strong sense. However, I worry how well-
motivated the search for such responses would be, for reasons I shall explore in the 
next section. 
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5 Epistemic value and achievement 
I am happy to grant that understanding is valuable, or at least better than epistemic 
states that fall short of it. However, I doubt that achievement is the right place to look 
for an explanation of this, or, for that matter, for an explanation of the value of other 
epistemic states, including knowledge. 
I have suggested that Pritchard’s particular attempt to explain the value of 
understanding by appeal to the value of achievement fails. That attempt is just one 
instance of a more general tendency to attempt to explain the value of a given 
epistemic state, including knowledge, by appeal to the achievement acquiring it 
involves, or by appeal to the successful exercise of certain cognitive abilities which 
results in that state. In the remainder of this paper, I shall suggest that attempts of this 
sort do not look very promising, quite apart from their details. 
Although not all use the language of achievement, appeals to notions of that 
sort are central to many accounts of epistemic value, especially to virtue-theoretic 
accounts. According to Ernest Sosa, for example, a true belief constitutes knowledge 
only if it is ‘apt’, that is, only if it is true because it is the result of the subject’s skill, 
adroitness, or competence.
15
 In turn, this is supposed to explain how knowledge might 
be something of ‘fundamental value’.
16
 The thought, presumably, is that exercising 
one’s ‘epistemic virtues’ in a way that results in accurate belief is, like apt 
performance in general, valuable. In a similar fashion, John Greco holds that  
knowledge is a kind of success from ability, and in general success from ability is 
both intrinsically valuable and constitutive of human flourishing, which is also 
intrinsically valuable. Moreover, both success from ability and human flourishing 
have ‘final’ value, or value as ends in themselves, independently of any instrumental 
value that they might also have.
17
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Since Greco views understanding as a species of knowledge—specifically, knowledge 
of causes in the Aristotelian sense—he might tell a similar story about the value of 
understanding.
18
 Finally, Wayne Riggs maintains, very roughly, that knowledge is 
true belief ‘due to your own powers and abilities’ and ‘that this “credit-worthiness” 
feature of knowledge is what makes it distinctively valuable’.
19
  
 These all represent attempts, like Pritchard’s, to account for the value of an 
epistemic state such as knowledge or understanding by appeal to the idea that the 
relevant state is a success attributable to the skill or ability of the subject. Above (§2), 
some doubt was cast on the idea that mere success from ability—that is, achievement 
in the (WEAK) sense—is valuable. Moreover, I suspect considerations like those 
adduced above (§3) could be used to show that knowledge, like understanding, need 
not result from achievement in the (STRONG) sense. But, setting these concerns aside, 
and so granting that the relevant epistemic states are significant successes because of 
ability, I shall question whether appealing to that fact holds much promise as an 
explanation of the value of such states. 
Whether or not a success is an achievement is an etiological matter; it 
concerns how it came about it (say, through the overcoming of obstacles). In that case, 
one might expect that appealing to achievement could at most account for the value of 
arriving at an epistemic state, not of being in it, of acquiring an epistemic status, not 
of having it. Compare the following. Climbing to the summit of Mount Everest is a 
great achievement and to that extent valuable. It does not follow that sitting on the 
summit of Mount Everest is an achievement, let alone valuable, even if one could 
only sit on the summit of Mount Everest having climbed there. Similarly, creating the 
world’s largest rubber band ball might be an achievement, and so to some extent 
valuable. But it is far from clear that what results from this achievement—a large 
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rubber band ball or, indeed, the status of having made a large rubber band ball—is 
valuable; both the aforementioned upshots seem worthless.  
One might complain that these cases are disanalogous to cases of knowledge 
and the like in an important respect. A subject’s being on the summit of Mount 
Everest, for example, is externally related to the exercise of skill responsible for it, 
which is to say that that state or her being in it does not represent or embody 
achievement. In contrast, on the view under consideration, a subject’s being in the 
relevant epistemic state is internally related to the exercise of skill responsible for it, 
which is to say that that state or her being in it does represent or embody achievement.  
This point does not get the proponent of the view under consideration very far. 
Compare the following. To characterise someone as the winner of a competition to 
make the world’s largest rubber band ball is to characterise her as both successful and 
creditable for that success. A subject’s being the winner of such a competition is, then, 
internally related to her having enjoyed an achievement of sorts. However, while 
winning the competition might have been valuable, insofar as it was an achievement, 
being the winner of the competition, a status one might enjoy long after having 
acquired it, does not appear valuable in the slightest; at most, it is the status of having 
done something of value, rather than a valuable status to have. Likewise, if it is true 
that to characterise an epistemic state as, say, knowledge is to characterise it as a 
successful result creditable to the subject in that state, this would only show that 
knowledge, a state one might enjoy long after having arrived at it, is a state of having 
done something of value, rather than a valuable state to be in. 
Even in cases where the achievement and what results from the achievement 
are both valuable, the value might not be the same in each case. Suppose that one 
graduates from a top university with a first-class degree. Assuming that this success is 
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creditable to one’s skills, perhaps in the face of great social and intellectual obstacles, 
graduating represents or embodies a considerable achievement, and so is something of 
corresponding value. Moreover, being a graduate of such an institution in possession 
of such a qualification is no doubt valuable too, though in different ways; perhaps it is 
conducive to a successful career, a generous salary, and so forth. So, being a graduate 
both is an enduring state or condition which is valuable in certain respects and 
indicates or entails that the person in that state or condition has displayed a valuable 
achievement, namely graduating, but the value of the former does not appear to be 
explained by or reducible to the value of the latter.  
The point is not that being a graduate is only instrumentally valuable, in 
contrast to the final value of graduating—for all I say here, being a graduate might be 
finally valuable too. The point is only that the good of being a graduate and the good 
of graduating look like different goods, even though one could only be a graduate 
having graduated. Returning to the issue at hand, a certain enduring epistemic state or 
condition might both be valuable in certain respects and indicate or entail that the 
person in that state or condition has displayed a valuable cognitive achievement, 
without the value of the former being the same as or reducible to the value of the 
latter. 
 
6 Concluding remarks 
I have suggested that to look for the value of an epistemic state in the achievement 
reaching it involves is to look in the wrong place. Even if it were true that one can 
have knowledge or understanding only through achievement, which I doubt for 
reasons outlined above with respect to understanding, this would appear at most to 
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account for the value of coming to know or understand, not of knowing or 
understanding, that is, of arriving at the relevant epistemic state, not of being in it. 
These considerations—which are not intended to cast doubt on virtue-theoretic 
theories of epistemic states but only on certain virtue-theoretic and like-minded 
explanations of the value such states seem to possess—are, I admit, not decisive as 
they stand. But they do give some reason to be sceptical about the prospects of trying 
to account, as many do, for the value of knowledge, understanding and the like in 
etiological terms.  
Any such scepticism might prompt one to revise one’s judgements about the 
epistemic value of the relevant states while paving the way for an account that will 
explain away the appearance of value which is responsible for such judgements. 
Perhaps the relevant state is not distinctively valuable and the intuition to the contrary 
is the result of wrongly projecting on to the state the value of the achievement that 
coming to be in it allegedly involves. An alternative, which I would recommend, 
would be to hold on to the judgements about the epistemic value of the relevant states 
and look elsewhere for a story which vindicates them.
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